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CHIPS Articles: Marine Corps Releases Use of Geo Location-Capable Devices, Applications, and Services: MARADMIN 023/21R

Marine Corps Releases Use of Geo Location-Capable Devices, Applications, and Services: MARADMIN 023/21R
By U.S. Marine Corps - January 15, 2021
Date Signed: 1/14/2021 | MARADMINS Number: 023/21R 141610Z JAN 21

REF/A/DEPSECDEF MEMORANDUM/20180803/-//
REF/B/USD I&S AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER MEMORANDUM/20190130/-//
REF/C/DODI 2000.26/20191204/-//
REF/D/MCO 3302.1F/20190415/-//
REF/E/MCO 3070.2A/20130702/-//

POC/JAMES SYDNOR/CIV/CMC WASHINGTON DC PS/LOC: WASHINGTON DC/TEL: 703-692-4235/DSN: 222-4235/EMAIL: JAMES.J.SYDNOR@USMC.MIL//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. The rapidly evolving market of devices, applications, and services with geolocation capabilities (e.g., fitness trackers, smartphones, tablets, smartwatches, and related software applications and games) presents a significant risk to Marine Corps personnel both on and off duty, and to our military operations globally.

2. These geolocation capabilities, combined with photography, can expose personal information, locations, routines, and numbers of DoD personnel, potentially creating unintended security consequences and increased risk to our force and mission.

3. Per references (a) and (b), geolocation features and functionality on both non-government and government-issued devices, applications, and services present a security risk for the force.

3.A.1. Use of geolocation features within operational areas (OAs) designated by Combatant Commanders are prohibited unless authorized by the Combatant Commander or their designee.

3.A.2. Use of geolocation features on Marine Corps installation not within designated OAs may be prohibited in a tiered approach by commanders and supervisors at all levels.

4. Commanders of Operation Areas.

4.A.1. May authorize the use of geolocation capabilities on non-government devices, applications, and services in OAs after conducting a threat-based comprehensive Operations Security (OPSEC) survey, per DoD Directive 5205.02E, DoD Operations Security Program and reference (e).

4.A.2. May authorize the use of geolocation capabilities on government-issued devices, applications, and services in OAs based upon mission necessity, taking into account the potential OPSEC risks. Commanders will utilize the risk management guidance as outlined in reference b.

5. Commanders of other locations, installations, and activities

5.A.1. Will provide OPSEC training and guidance, in accordance with DoD Directive 5205.02E, commensurate with the risk and local operating conditions.

5.A.1. Should apply a tiered structure for categorizing location and operations sensitivity while incorporating risk factors to ensure restrictions are consistently and rationally applied.

6. Suspicious Activity Reporting.

6.A. Per reference d, commanders will use Eagle Eyes (EE) to ensure suspicious incidents are reported, recorded for future analysis, and shared throughout the Marine Corps protection community. Listed below are a description of EE, the USMC SAR tool, and the definitions of Unauthorized/Suspicious Photography and Observation /Surveillance as defined in reference c.

6.A.1. EE is the official Marine Corps community awareness SAR program. The program allows anyone to report suspicious activity through the EE website, www.usmceagleeyes.org, or locally designated phone numbers. Individuals can provide detailed information and, when possible, imagery from mobile devices, security cameras, or other imagery devices.

All EE reports submitted via phone call to the local EE phone number, security personnel, or USMC law enforcement shall be entered into the EE system by the security personnel receiving the report. All reports submitted through the EE website are automatically uploaded into the Marine Corps Suspicious Activity Information Portal (MCSAIP) and analyzed by designated and specially trained personnel. Personnel with MCSAIP access can enter the report directly into MCSAIP or via the TrapWire mobile application.

6.A.2. Unauthorized/Suspicious Photography. Taking pictures or video of persons, facilities, buildings, or infrastructure in an unusual or surreptitious manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person. Examples include taking pictures or video of infrequently used access points, the superstructure of a bridge, personnel performing security functions (e.g., patrols, badge/vehicle checking), security-related equipment (e.g., perimeter fencing, security cameras), etc.

6.A.3. Observation/Surveillance. Demonstrating unusual or prolonged interest in facilities, buildings, or infrastructure beyond mere casual (e.g., tourists) or professional (e.g., engineers) interest and in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person. Examples include observation through binoculars, taking notes, attempting to mark off or measure distances, etc.

7. This MARADMIN is applicable to the Marine Corps total force.

8. This MARADMIN is effective on the date released and will be codified with the publication of MCO 3070.2A

8. Release authorized by SES Randy Smith, Assistant Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies and Operations, (Security), Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps.//

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